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Abstract
This commentary on the Editorial ‘The politics and analytics of health policy’ by Professor Calum Paton focuses on 
two issues. First, it points to the unclear links between ideas, ideology, values, and discourse and policy, and warns 
that discourse is often a poor guide to enacted policy. Second, it suggests that realism, particularly ‘programme 
theory’ are useful tools for health policy analysis. ‘Market reform’ cannot be reduced to a simple ‘four legs good, two 
legs bad’ verdict, and programme theory might suggest that certain mechanisms may be good for one outcome in a 
particular context, but bad for another. 
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Sometimes titles do not give much away. ‘The politics and analytics of health policy’ could cover a very wide range of issues. In this article Calum Paton (1) does cover 
a wide range of issues in ‘breadth’ rather than ‘depth’ terms, 
making many interesting points in a fleeting fashion without 
having the time or space to develop then further. I am not 
fully certain what his main ‘take home’ message is, apart from: 
positivitism and neo-liberalism- bad; political science, inter-
disciplinary study, Hirschmann- good. I have selected from 
this broad canvas two issues to focus on. 
First, Paton discusses ideas, ideology, values, and discourse, 
but it is not clear whose. He writes that there is a difference 
in attitude on the part of the majority towards collectivism 
and individualism in access to, provision of and financing 
of healthcare, and that ideology can shape institutions: 
approaches to change can affect how politicians and other 
actors behave within political institutions. However, the links 
between ideas, ideology, values, and discourse and policy 
are far from clear. 
Most opinion poll evidence suggests that the British 
population are very attached to the principles and values of the 
National Health Service (NHS) such as tax-funded and ‘free 
at the point of use’. However, despite governments’ swearing 
loyalty to these tablets of stone and invocations of the ‘NHS 
Constitution’, the NHS has not been totally free at the point of 
use to most or arguably all of its 66-year history. The latest in 
a long line of Baldrick-line ‘cunning plans’ call for  (further) 
charges in the NHS such as ‘membership’ charges and ‘hotel’ 
costs, but the NHS is not a gym or a hotel. The implications 
for policy analysts are how to understand the links between 
public and policy-makers’ ideas and values and institutional 
change, and for activists of how to ensure that public values 
are taken into account in policy making. Perhaps an ‘iron law’ 
of the NHS is that there is an inverse relationship between the 
importance of a topic on paper and in practice. The NHS has 
‘talked a good game’ on ‘patient and public involvement’ for 
many years, but  the mantra ‘no decision about me without 
me’ probably vies with ‘we are all in this together’ as the 
most inaccurate description of current government policy. 
This is a particular problem when ‘technocratic’ solutions 
or ‘evidence-based policy’ clash head on with public wishes. 
For example, evidence may say fewer and larger hospitals, but 
many communities do not wish to lose ‘their’ local hospital. 
Similarly, RCTs may say that homeopathy is of little value, but 
some ‘consumers’ value it greatly. 
I am not convinced that ‘discourse’ is a reliable guide to policy. 
As a mere policy analyst rather than linguistic expert, I prefer 
to look at what governments do rather than what they say. 
Paton states that the dominant health policy discourse is now 
of the market. However, in my view, British governments 
tend not to say that they wish to ‘marketise’ or ‘privatise’ the 
NHS [whatever that means- see (2)]. For example, in office, 
Labour did not favour the ‘M’ and ‘P’ words, and now in 
opposition, suffers severe policy amnesia, saying that the 
Coalition has begun to marketise and privatise the NHS, but 
most commentators point to policy evolution rather than 
revolution between Labour and Coalition health policy (2,3). 
Second, Paton discusses the so-called positivist or 
‘quantitative’ approach. In particular, he claims that  the 
‘extreme positivist’ approach has been exemplified recently by 
research in England which has been used to argue that market 
forces are beneficial in public healthcare systems on the basis 
that ‘competition saves lives’. He is correct that correlations 
without causality are dangerous. However, I wonder if this is 
an example of ‘shooting the messenger’? Would he be equally 
critical of quantitative research that (say) links inequality and 
poor health, or ‘capitalism kills’? 
Paton is correct to criticise both crude positivism and ‘anti-
positivism’/unhelpful relativism. In my view, an appropriate 
course to steer between these two treacherous reefs is 
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realism, or at least ‘realism-lite’. Although Pawson and Tilley’s 
(4) famous equation of C+M= O has been reduced to a 
meaningless mantra by some subsequent commentators, the 
essence that mechanisms interact in complex ways to achieve 
outcomes should be noted. This means that ‘programme 
theory’ of plausible accounts should be constructed 
for the quantitative examples above (competition saves 
lives; capitalism kills). Similarly, ‘one size does not fit all’ 
(‘organisational copy-cattism’ in Paton’s terms) suggests that 
the search for the universal organisational fix or simple policy 
transfer is likely to be fruitless. 
However, it also suggests that a crude favouring of or 
opposition to ‘market reform’ may be too simplistic. First, 
although markets may be dominant in the policy mix, it is 
necessary to take note of the remaining hierarchy and network 
elements.  The NHS is not a one club market golfer, although 
it may favour that club over the others in its golf bag. Second, 
the term disguises a large range of mechanisms in different 
contexts that may have more impact (positive or negative) 
on different outcomes. Gingrich (5) challenges the highly 
ideological debate over markets, arguing that the focus on 
the ‘good’ or ‘bad’ effects of markets obscures the reality of 
what markets do [see also (3)]. Rather than a simple ‘four 
legs good, two legs bad’, programme theory might suggest 
that certain mechanisms may be good for one outcome in a 
particular context, but bad for another. In this sense, criticism 
of market reform needs to be an analytical rapier rather than 
an ideological bludgeoning club. 
In conclusion, Paton raises important issues concerned with 
‘the politics and analytics of health policy’. As interest (and 
funding) moves to increasingly quantitative, technical, and 
‘value-free’ ‘health service research’ which is in danger of 
telling us the price of everything and the value of nothing, 
he is correct to remind us of the value of this important and 
increasingly neglected area. 
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